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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS IN THE COMMISSIONERS1 BRIEF,
THE SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF TITLES 7 AND 7OB CLEARLY SHOW
THAT THE COMMISSIONERS1 DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE, EXAMINE
AND SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS
Utah Code Ann, §§ 7-1-7; 7-1-8; 7-1-26(1); 7-1-26(6); 72-1; and 7-3-3 show that from the day a financial institution seeks
to begin a banking business, to the day it is merged or closed, the
criteria for each important decision required of the commissioners
hinges upon whether the depositors are protected.

Thus, Title 7

shows a clear intent to protect the depositors.
Further, Title 70B did not change or repeal the commissioners'
duties set forth in Title 7.

What Title 7OB did do is enlarge the

duty of the commissioners to investigate, examine and supervise
Grove Finance.
POINT II
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS
CONSIDERED AS A FORM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR AS AN
ELEMENT IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE, THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT
BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS
A disciplined review of Utah case law shows that this
court's

acceptance

of the Public

Duty Doctrine

is based

sovereign immunity rather than a negligence analysis.

upon

The Public

Duty Immunity was repealed by Utah's Governmental Immunity Act as
it existed when this action was filed.
1

Further, negligence analysis shows that the commissioners1 had a duty to the depositors to excimine, investigate and
supervise Grove Finance•
POINT III
GOOD FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR
THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS
At the time the depositors filed this action, Utah's
Governmental Immunity Statute had repealed the common law forms of
sovereign immunity.

The statutory section the commissioners rely

upon was not passed until one year after the depositors sued the
commissioners.

Further,

if

the

commissioners

were

grossly

negligent, then by definition, they did not act in good faith.
POINT IV
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NO GROUNDS
FOR DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
The filing of this litigation as a class action tolls the
statute of limitations for unnamed members of the class. Therefore,
the claims of the unnamed defendants are not barred.

It was clear

error for the lower court to deny class action certification on the
erroneous belief that the claims were time barred.
POINT V
THE DEPOSITORS MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF
REQUIRED BY RULE 23
Rule 23, U.R.C.P. only requires the depositor to plead or
otherwise establish the class action facts set forth in Rule 23.
2

The depositors did so. The commissioners did not contest the class
action facts in the lower court proceedings.

The depositors met

the burden required by Rule 23.
POINT VI
RES JUDICATA IS NO BASIS FOR DENYING
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
The application of Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P. 2d 405 (Utah
1989) and res judicata do not bar the class claims of the unnamed
depositors because the parties in Hilton and in this action are
different.

Further, the claims brought against Borthick and

Brimhall as individuals were not litigated in Hilton, nor should
they have been litigated in Hilton.
POINT VII
THE ISSUES CONCEDED OR NOT BRIEFED BY THE
COMMISSIONERS REQUIRE A REVERSAL
The commissioners conceded or failed to brief approximately eight issues raised in the Depositors1 Brief.

The issues

not responded to by the commissioners require reversal of the lower
courtfs summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.
IV.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The appellants are 11 depositors who lost their savings
in the Grove Finance Co. ("Grove Finance").
3

The depositors sued

Department of Financial Institutions commissioners Brimhall and
Borthick, as individuals, for gross negligence.
This is not the first appeal in this litigation.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989),

In

(referred to as

"Madsen II" in Appellants1 Brief and hereinafter), the Utah Supreme
Court held that these depositors could sue Brimhall and Borthick
for gross negligence. The court ruled that the depositors1 claims
against Borthick and Brimhall are not barred by any statute of
limitations nor by governmental immunity.
On remand, the lower court committed three fundamental
errors.

First, even though Madsen II held that the depositors

could sue Borthick and Brimhall, the lower court granted Borthickfs
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Second, Madsen II held that
the statute of limitations did not bar claims against Brimhall.
The lower court, contrary to Madsen II, ruled that the statute of
limitations barred the depositors1 claims against Brimhall and
granted his motion for summary judgment. Finally, the lower court
refused to certify this case as a class action even though it meets
the criteria of Rule 23, U.R.C.P.
The depositors1 opening brief raised numerous issues
which can be grouped into four categories as follows:
A.

Whether claims against Brimhall are barred by any

statute of limitations.

4

B.

Whether

the

commissioners

can

be

sued

by the

depositors for gross negligence.
C.

Whether common law good faith immunity bars the

depositors1 claims against the commissioners.
D.

Whether the lower court erred in refusing to certify

this case as a class action.
The appellees, in their brief, failed to respond to the
following issues raised in appellants1 opening brief:
1.

Madsen

II held

that

none

of

the

statutes of

limitation urged by Brimhall bar the depositors'
claims.
2.

A

special

relationship

exists

between

the

commissioners and Grove Finance which created a
duty to depositors.
3.

Res

judicata

precludes

the

commissioners

from

raising the public duty defense.
4.

Whether the commissioners performed their statutory
duties

honestly

and

in

good

faith

is

a fact

question which precludes judgment on the pleadings.
5.

This litigation meets the class action criteria of
Rule

23

and

the

lower

court

erred

when

it

considered issues outside Rule 23.
6.

The depositors did not seek to consolidate this
case with another case. It was error for the lower
5

court to consider possible consolidation as a basis
to deny class action certification.
7.

It was error to deny class certification without
stating the reasons for the decision.

The depositors1 reply brief responds to the arguments raised by the
commissioners and argues that the respondents1 silence on issues
raised in the appellants1 opening brief requires reversal of the
trial court's judgments.
POINT I
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS IN THE COMMISSIONERS1 BRIEF,
THE SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF TITLES 7 AND 7OB CLEARLY SHOW
THAT THE COMMISSIONERS' DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE, EXAMINE AND
SUPERVISE GROVE FINANCE RUN TO THE DEPOSITORS
A.

Introduction.
The commissioners' thesis is that:
Titles 7 and 70B were not designed to protect
appellants [depositors].
Title 7 plainly
declares that its purpose is to protect the
general public rather than particular individuals. (Appellees1 Brief p. 14.)
The commissioners rely solely on Section 7-1-3

(1979

Supp.) which requires the commissioners to make a report on
"matters that may be of interest to the public."

Section 7-1-3 is

not a sound basis for arguing that Title 7 duties do not run to the
depositors.

The substance and the structure of Title 7 and Title

7OB show a clear intent to protect the depositors.

6

B.

Title 7.
In 1981, the Utah legislature repealed most of Title 7

and replaced

it with the Financial Institution Act of 1981.

Citations to Title 7 and Title 70B in this brief and the depositors
opening brief are to the laws existing in 1980, unless otherwise
indicated.
Whether

an

institution

conducts

a banking

business

subject to the regulation of the commissioners depends entirely
upon whether the institution is "holding itself out to the public
as receiving money in deposit whether evidenced by a certificate,
promissory note or otherwise. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-3.

If

depositors existed, regulation was triggered by the act.
A financial institutions articles of incorporation could
only be approved by the commissioner if the commissioner found the
incorporation "will be honestly conducted in accordance with law
and for the best interest of the . . . depositors of the institution. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26(1). Also, financial institu-

tion mergers could only be approved if "necessary to protect
depositors. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-26(6).

Moreover, Section

7-1-8 required the commissioners to annually conduct a financial
examination of the institution. A primary purpose was to determine
"whether or not it is complying with its articles of incorporation.
. . ."

i.e., conducting its business in such a way as to "protect

the depositors".

Finally, the commissioners could take over the
7

institution

if

the

institution

was

depositors,

Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1.

unable

to

timely

pay

its

In summary, from the day a financial institution began a
banking business to the day the institution merged or closed, the
criteria for each critical decision required of the

commissioner

hinged upon whether the depositors were protected. The
and

structure

of

Title

7

clearly

shows

an

intent

that

the

Title

substance

to

protect

depositors.

C.

Title 70B.
The

commissioners

contend

7OB

duty

to

examine, investigate and supervise Grove Finance does not run to
the

depositors.

(Appellees 1

Brief

p.

15.)

The

commissioners

incorrectly assume that Title 7 does not apply and that Title 7OB
should not be applied in conjunction with Title 7.
The commissioners are the administrators under both Title
7

(banking laws) and 70B

seq. ; § 70B-6-103.

The

(the UCCC) .
drafters

of

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-1
Title

70B

recognized

et

that

certain financial institutions were subject to, and regulated by,
both Title 7 and Title 70B.
Many transactions are subject both to this Act
and to other bodies of law.
(Comment of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws § 70B-3-501)
,f
(hereinafter "Comment Section
) .
One such financial institution was Grove Finance.
Finance

was

subject

to

Title

7 because

8

it

conducted

a

Grove
banking

business.

Because Grove conducted

a banking business, it was

defined as a "supervised financial organization" under Title 70B:
(17) Supervised financial organization: A
person or organization . . . (a) organized
chartered, or holding an authorized certificate under the laws of this state . . . which
authorize the person to make loans and to
receive deposits, including a savings share
certificate or deposit account, and (b) subject to supervision by an official or agency
of this state or of the United States. Utah
Code Ann. § 70B-1-301 (17).
The Comment to Section 70B-1-301(13) explains how supervised
financial organizations such as Grove Finance were to be regulated:
This definition defines the class of lenders
which may engage in the business of making
supervised loans . . . without being licensed
under the Act by the Administrator, Section
3.501 and 3.502 [UCCC]. If a lender of this
class is subject to supervision by an official
or agency other than the Administrator, the
power
of
examination,
investigation
and
enforcement under this Act may be exercised by
that official or agency. Section 6.105. This
class of lender typically includes persons
authorized to make loans and receive deposits
or their equivalent such as commercial banks,
savings banks, savings and loan associations
and credit unions.
Comment Section 70B-1301(17).
In summary, the substance and structure of Title 7OB
shows that the commissioners1 duties to investigate, examine and
supervise Grove Finance were not done away with by the passage of
Title 70B.
Title 7.

The commissioners always had the duties set forth in
In addition, because Grove Finance was a supervised

lender, the commissioners had a duty to examine and investigate
9

Grove Finance under Utah Code Ann, § 70B-3-506(1).

See, Appel-

lants1 Opening Brief pp. 24-25.
POINT II
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE IS
CONSIDERED AS A FORM OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR AS AN
ELEMENT IN A NEGLIGENCE CASE, THE DOCTRINE DOES
NOT BAR THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS
A.

Introduction.
Many States which have adopted the "general duty" versus

"special duty" dichotomy acknowledge that the Public Duty Doctrine
is a branch of sovereign immunity.

That is, there is sovereign or

governmental immunity when the duty is only owed to the public in
general.

But, there can be sovereign or governmental liability

when the duty breached

is owed to a particular person.

E.g. ,

Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. App. 1971); Simpson's Food Fair Inc. v. Evansville, 272 N.E.2d

871

(Ind. App.

1971).
States which accept the public duty doctrine as a form of
governmental immunity do so because "to hold otherwise would expose
the government to liability for practically every action taken."
57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal, Etc., Tort Liability, § 141 at 154 (1988) .
If the Public Duty Doctrine is a branch of sovereign immunity, then
the Governmental Immunity Act, as it existed at the time these
claims arose, repealed such immunity.
34) .

However,

the

commissioners
10

(Appellants brief pp. 33-

argue

that

the

Public

Duty

Doctrine is not a branch of sovereign immunity.

They claim the

Public Duty Doctrine simply means that there is no duty, a required
element in a negligence case. A review of Utah case law suggests
the commissioners1 analysis is wrong.
B.

The Public Duty Doctrine in Utah.
The public duty doctrine was accepted by the Utah Supreme

Court in Obrav v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971). In
Obray, the court applied the doctrine to shield an officer for
failing to investigate a burglary.

The primary ground for the

court's ruling was the statute of limitations.

However, in the

last paragraph of the opinion, the court said that the duty to
investigate was a discretionary duty owed to the public. Thus, the
Public Duty Doctrine was linked with traditional discretionary
conduct sovereign immunity:
[W]e believe that defendants1 contention that
failure by a public sheriff to investigate a
crime claimed by an individual to have been
committed, ordinarily is a matter of judgment
and discretion, not actionable or compensable,
and not pursuable by an individual since the
public official's duty is to the public. . .
Obrav at 19.
Thereafter, in Christenson v. Havward, 694 P. 2d 612 (Utah
1984) , this court used the Public Duty Doctrine to shield an
officer from liability for failing to arrest an intoxicated motorcyclist. However, the court did not state whether its decision was
based on negligence or immunity analysis.
11

Subsequently, in Ferree v. State. 784 P. 2d 149 (Utah
1989) the court applied the public duty doctrine to shield corrections officers from liability for failing to supervise a man who
committed murder while away from a halfway house.

Initially, the

opinion suggests a negligence analysis:
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Ferree, at 151.
However, the real reason for applying the public duty
doctrine is revealed later in the opinion:
It would expose the state to potentially every
wrong that flows from the necessary programs
of rehabilitation and paroling of prisoners. .
the effect could well be to burden
corrections officials and chill legitimate
rehabilitative programs. . . . The public
interest would not be served by imposing
liability on corrections officials and the
state. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Ferree v.
State, at 151.
The rationale set forth in Ferree is not compatible with
duty analysis in a negligence case.

The essential question in

negligence duty analysis is whether the plaintiff's interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. Duty
is an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled
to protection.
1971).

W. L. Prosser, Law of Torts 3 25, 32 6 (4th ed.

Thus, whether a duty exists in a negligence case depends

upon numerous factors.

One is the relationship of the parties.
12

Another is whether one assumes responsibility for the safety of
property or deprives a person of self protection. DCR Inc. v. Peek
Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983); Beach v. University of Utah,
726 P.2d 413

(Utah 1986).

Foreseeability of harm is another

important factor. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah
1974) .

In addition, a statute can impose duties.

were not considered in Ferree.

These factors

Instead, Ferree1s public duty

analysis is nearly identical to the following sovereign immunity
analysis set forth in Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions,
782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989):
To provide the utmost public protection,
governmental entitles should not be dissuaded
from engaging in such activities by the fear
that liability may be imposed if an employee
performs his duties inadequately. Moreover, if
liability existed for this type of activity,
the risk exposure to which a public entity
would be subject would include virtually all
activities going on within the community. Id.
at 513.
In summary, this court's acceptance of the Public Duty
Doctrine is based on sovereign immunity —

not negligence. There-

fore, the public duty doctrine form of common law immunity was
repealed by the Governmental Immunity Act as it existed at the time
the depositors sued the commissioners for their gross negligence.
C.

Public Duty as an Element in a Negligence Case.
Even if the Public Duty Doctrine is viewed as an element

of negligence analysis, the Public Duty Doctrine does not shield
the commissioners from the claims of the depositors.
13

As previously stated, whether a duty exists depends upon
numerous factors.

When applied to this case, numerous factors

create a duty to investigate, examine and supervise Grove Finance
for the protection of the depositors. Special relationships exist.
(Appellants' Brief pp. 2 6 - 27.)
duty.

(Point I, supra.)

The banking laws establish the

It was foreseeable that the depositors

would be harmed if the commissioners did not investigate, examine
and supervise Grove Finance. Moreover, the depositors, relying on
the state to regulate Grove Finance, could not protect themselves.
POINT III
GOOD FAITH QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR
THE DEPOSITORS1 CLAIMS
A.

Introduction.
The commissioners

argue that common

law good

faith

qualified immunity bars the depositors1 claims because Section 6330-4(2) allows for common law immunity; and the decision whether to
supervise Grove Finance under Title 7 or 7OB is a discretionary
decision, so the commissioners cannot be sued.
However, Section 63-30-4(2) was passed by the legislature
in 1982 after the depositors brought this action. Further, whether
to regulate Grove Finance under Title 7 or Title 70B is not a discretionary decision. Even if it was, factual issues would preclude
a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.
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B.

At the Time the Claims of the Depositors Arose, the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act Repealed Common Law Forms of
Immunity Including "Good Faith Qualified Immunity."
The concept of good faith qualified immunity is a common

law form of sovereign immunity. See, Utah State University v. SutrO
& Co., 646 P.2d 715, 721 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Granite School
District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 407, 413 P.2d 597 (1966).
The passage of a Governmental Immunity Act may amend or
repeal common law concepts of governmental immunity.

C.f., Hansen

v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (1990).
The

commissioners

argue

that

common

law

good

faith

qualified immunity was not repealed because one year after the
depositors filed this action, the legislature passed Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-4(2):
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as adversely affecting any immunity from suit
which a governmental entity or employee may
otherwise assert under statute or federal law.
This is not the first time the commissioners have sought
to retroactively

apply Governmental Immunity Act amendments to

shield them from liability.

In Madsen II, the court refused to

retroactively apply Governmental Immunity Act amendments.

It held

t~hat the Governmental Immunity Act as it existed in 1980, not 1982,
must be applied to this case.
C.

Madsen II at 252.

The Commissioners1 Duties Were Not Discretionary.
The depositors, in their opening brief, showed that each

of the numerous and specific statutory duties set forth in Title 7
15

and Title 7OB were mandatory duties that are not discretionary.
Appellants' Brief pp. 3 7 - 3 8 .

The commissioners respond that the

decision to regulate Grove Finance under Title 7 or Title 70B is
discretionary so the depositors can't sue the commissioners for
gross negligence in failing to perform the specific duties set
forth in Title 7 and Title 70B.
The Commissioners' response is contrary to Title 7 and
Title 70B as set forth in Point I of this brief.
compliments Title 7.

It does not replace Title 7.

Title 70B
There was no

decision, discretionary or otherwise, for the commissioners to
make.

They were obligated to perform the duties set forth in both

Title 7 and Title 70B.
Further, even

if the commissioners

could

choose to

regulate Grove Finance under one title to the exclusion of the
other, that choice does not excuse the commissioners from performing the ministerial duties contained in the title selected by
the commissioners.
Finally, the depositors are suing the commissioners for
failing to perform the statutory duties required to implement the
policies set forth in Utah's then existing banking law and the
UCCC. Decisions or actions implementing a pre-existing policy are
not discretionary functions.

Hansen, supra at 84 6.

Moreover,

whether the decisions and actions implement a pre-existing policy
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is a factual
pleadings.

issue precluding a motion for judgment on the

Id.
POINT IV
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NO GROUNDS FOR
DENYING CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

The commissioners, in their brief, argue that the lower
court properly denied class action status to this litigation
because the statute of limitations bars the claims of the unnamed
depositors.
[T]ime barred claims are not revived by their
assertion in a class action. (Appellees1 Brief
p. 32.)
However, the depositors1 claims are not time barred. The
depositors commenced this litigation as a class action against
Brimhall and Borthick.

In Madsen II, this court ruled that no

statute of limitations urged by the commissioners bars the claims.
In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974),
the United States Supreme Court held that the filing of a class
action tolls the running of any applicable statute of limitations
for all asserted members of the class.

Thus, the filing of the

class action by the depositors completely tolls any statute of
limitations.
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court in Crown Cork
& Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), held that an applicable
statute of limitations was tolled during the period that there was
17

a pending class action in which the plaintiff was a putative class
member.

Id. at 344.

Subsequent to American Pipe and Crown Cork,

federal courts have applied the holdings of these two cases to rule
that the statute of limitations is tolled until the appellate court
rules or refuses to rule on the class action status issue.

West

Haven School District v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 721 F.Supp. 1547
(D. Conn. 1988); see, Byrd v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 675
F.Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987); c.f., Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., 674
F.Supp. 623 (N.D. 111. 1987).
Thus, any possible statute of limitations is tolled until
a final decision is reached by this court on the class action
certification issue.

It was clear error for the lower court to

deny class action certification on the erroneous belief that the
claims were time barred.
POINT V
THE DEPOSITORS MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF
REQUIRED BY RULE 2 3
The commissioners, in their brief, correctly argue:
In seeking class certification, the appellants1 bear the burden of establishing that
the cause of action merits treatment of a
class action. (Appellees' Brief at 30.)
However, the commissioners fail to explain what that burden is. In
truth, the burden is light and the depositors met it.
Rule 23

is a procedural device invoked

in the first

instance by a complaint and maintained by a court order which
18

applies the Rule 23 criteria.

Accordingly, a class action arises

prima facie from a well pleaded complaint.
complaint
otherwise.

shifts

to

the

opposing

party

the

A properly plead
burden

to

show

2 H.B. Newberg, Newbera on Class Actions § 7.17 at 3 5

(Rev. ed. 1988) (hereinafter "Newberg §

at

" ) . In other

words, the plaintiff has the burden under notice pleading to plead
or otherwise establish certain basic class facts in the complaint
such as the approximate size of the class and why joinder is
impractical.

The plaintiff must also plead that common questions

of fact or law predominate the litigation.

In addition, judicial

notice and/or common sense assumptions by the court may create
rebuttable presumptions that the Rule 23 criteria are met. Newberg
§ 7.19 at 38.
Specifically,

once

the

plaintiff

pleads

or

shows

numerosity or impracticability of joinder, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show lack of numerosity, or practicability of joinder.
Newberg § 7.22 at 44.
Similarly,

once

the

plaintiff

pleads

or

otherwise

establishes common questions, the burden shifts to the defendant to
disprove common questions of fact and law.

Newberg § 7.23.

In addition, adequate representation is usually presumed
when, as in this case, there is an absence of contrary evidence.
Newberg § 7.24 at 48, 49.
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As set forth in the Appellants1 Brief pp. 4 5 - 47, the
elements required by Rule 2 3 were pled and established by the
depositors.

Moreover, the commissioners, in the lower court, did

not contest the class action facts.

In short, the depositors met

the burden required by Rule 23.
POINT VI
RES JUDICATA IS NO BASIS FOR DENYING
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
A.

Introduction.
The commissioners, in their brief, allege that the class

of unnamed depositors cannot sue the commissioners for gross
negligence because of Hilton v. Borthick, supra.

In Hilton, the

depositors sued the State and Borthick in his official capacity for
failing to properly inspect and regulate Grove Finance.

The

depositors lost simply because this court, in a 3-2 decision, ruled
that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act provided immunity to the
State and to Borthick in his official capacity.

Now Borthick says

that because he won in Hilton, the claims preclusion branch of res
judicata means that he wins against all other depositors except the
named depositors in this action.

He claims the court was correct

in not certifying the class.
However, claims preclusion does not apply in this case
because the parties are not identical.

Further, the depositors1

claims for gross negligence were not, should not and could not have
been presented in Hilton.
20

B.

The Parties are not Identical.
In Hilton, the defendants were the State and Borthick in

his official capacity.

In this case, the defendants are Brimhall

and Borthick in their individual capacities.

The parties simply

are not identical and are not treated in the same fashion.

As

explained in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497, 499
(Ky. 1980):
[Governmental bodies simply are not the same
animals as individuals. . . . As a result, the
traditional duty analysis applied in actions
for negligence against individuals is not appropriate in suits against government . . . .
C.

The Claims for Gross Negligence Against Brimhall and Borthick
Were not Brought in Hilton Nor Should They Have Been.
In Hilton v. Borthick, supraf and in Gillman v. Dept. of

Financial Institutions, supra, this court ruled that the State and
a commissioner in his official capacity were protected by Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act. In contrast, in this litigation (Madsen
II), this court ruled that the commissioners, in their individual
capacities, are not entitled to immunity under Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act.

Therefore, claims for gross negligence against the

individual commissioners should be litigated in this action.
In summary, the depositors1 claims against the state
should have been and were litigated against the state in Hilton.
However, the depositors claims against individual defendants for
gross negligence could and should be litigated in this action.
21

POINT VII
THE ISSUES CONCEDED OR NOT BRIEFED BY
THE COMMISSIONERS REQUIRE A REVERSAL
A.

Introduction.
Many of the issues raised in the depositors' brief were

not responded to by the commissioners.

(See, pp. 5-6, supra.)

Apparently Brimhall and Borthick concede these issues to the
depositors.

C.f., Roberts v. Sawyer, 252 F.2d 286 (10th Cir.

1958); United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1971); Leer
v. Murphv, 844 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1988).
B.

Public Duty Issues.
In their opening brief, the depositors showed that the

Public Duty Doctrine does not bar their claims because a special
relationship existed between the depositors and the commissioners
and a special relationship existed between the State and Grove
Finance.

The commissioners wholly failed to brief the special

relationships issues.
The depositors1 brief also argued that the application of
the Public Duty Doctrine, in this case, is contrary to the holding
of Madsen II.

The commissioners1 response is silence.

The depositors also showed that res judicata precludes
the commissioners from raising the public duty doctrine.
commissioners failed to respond to this dispositive issue.
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The

C.

Statute of Limitations Issues,
The depositors argued, on the basis of Matheson v.

Pearson 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), that Utah Code Ann. § 78-1225(2), a four year statute of limitations, governs this case. The
commissioners, in their brief, failed to respond.
In addition, the depositors cited authority that any
applicable statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
depositors lost their funds.

The commissioners1 response was,

again, silence.
D.

Common Law Qualified Immunity Issues.
The depositors, submitted that common law qualified

immunity cannot be grounds for a summary judgment or judgment on
the pleadings because the issue of whether the commissioners
performed their duties honestly and in good faith is a factual
issue.
E.

The commissioners did not respond to this argument.

Class Action Issues.
In

their

brief,

the

depositors

showed

litigation meets the requirements of U.R.C.P. 23.

that

this

The depositors

also showed that it is reversible error for a court to consider
factors other than those found in U.R.C.P. 23. The commissioners
do not brief these issues.
Finally, the depositors showed how it is reversible error
for the lower court not to state any reasons for its failure to
23

certify the litigation as a class action.

The commissioners did

not brief this issue.
F.

Conclusion.
These dispositive issues were not briefed by the commis-

sioners. These issues in and of themselves require reversal of the
lower court judgement.
V.
CONCLUSION
In Madsen II, this court ruled that no statute of
limitations barred the depositors1 claim, and that the depositors
could

sue

Brimhall

negligence.

and

Borthick,

as

individuals,

for

gross

The lower court's judgment on the pleadings and

summary judgment is contrary to the Madsen II ruling. Further, the
court committed clear error by refusing to certify this litigation
as a class action.

For these reasons, the judgments of the lower

court should be reversed and this case remanded with instructions
to certify this litigation as a class action.

DATED this IJ

day of April, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

By:

ZjsJ^^TtM&
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APPENDIX

7-2-1

BANKS AND BANKING

the banking department, or who knowingly or willfully makes any false
statement concerning any such bank or institution, or who is guilty of
any misconduct or corruption in office is guilty of a misdemeanor, and
is punishable accordingly, and m addition thereto shall be removed from
office by the governor.
History C. L 1917, § 1017x4, added by
L 1918, en IS, § 1 ; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
7-1-29.

Conateral References.
Personal liability of members of *rov.
ernmental banking department or their
sureties, 3S A L. R. 66C, 90 A. L. R. 1423.

CHAPTER 2
SUSPENSION AND LIQUIDATION
Section 7 2 1
When commissioner may take possession.
722
Jurisdiction of district coun
7-2 3.
Proceedings bv commissioner may be enjoined.
7 2-4
Resumption of business.
7 2-3
Receiver or assignee for creditors—Commissioner may succeed.
7-2-6.
Claims—Notice to creditors.
7-2-7.
Objection to claims—Trial of issues.
7-2-8.
Claims incurred after commissioner takes possession.
7 2-9
Rejection of claims—Action on—Limitations—Payment.
7 2-10. Inventory—List of claims—Reports of liquidation.
7-2-11. Special agents—Appointment and bond
7 2-3 2 Liouidation—Powers and duties of commissioners
7 2-13. Liquidation—Deposit of assets in banks—Preference
7 2-34. Expenses m liquidation of institutions
7-2-15. Preferences generally forbidden—Exceptions.
7-2-16. Dividends.
7-2-17 to 7-2-22. Repealed.
7 2-2°> Winding up—Election of procedure
7 2-24. Procedure when liquidation continued uncle* commissioner.
7-2-25 Procedure when liquidation continued under agents.
7-2-26 Duties and powers of liquidating agents.
7 2 27. Death or removal of liquidating apent.
7 2 28. Records of liquidation to be deposited in court.
7 2 29 Reorganization by depositors—Petition—Hearing—Notice—Objections
—Procedure
7 2 30. Transfer of assets to depositors or liquidating corporation—Conditions
precedent.
7 2 31 Corrmissioner to advise with depositors' committee
7.3_
Clearing nouse certificates—Powers of bank commissioner

7-2-1. When commissioner may take possession—Tne Dank commissiorm?y fortiwt* Take possession or + he business ard p^on^t^ of any ir.
<*' tutioi under ms supervision ui»enp\er n snail appear trial such institution
'I) Has violated its articles of incorporation or any law applicable
thereto
(2) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner,
or is practicing deception upon its members or the public, or is pursuing
a plan which is injurious to its members,
(o^ Is not m sound and safe condition to transact its business;
(4) Has had an impairment of its capital for a period of ninety days:
or>

SUSPENSION AND LIQUIDATION

7-2-2

(5) lias refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the terms
on which the deposits were received, or lias become otherwise insolvent;
(G) Has neglected or refused to comply with the terms of a duly and
legally authorized order issued by the bank commissioner;
(7) Has refused, upon proper demand, to submit its records and affairs
for inspection to an examiner of the banking department; or,
(8) Whenever it shall appear that its officers have refused to be
examined under oath regarding its affairs.
ential right by virtue of common law, such
right was lost, and surety for repayment
of funds was not entitled to priority. National Surety Co. v. Pixton, 60 V. 289, 208
P. 87S, 24 A. L. B.1487.

History: L. 1921, ch. 23, $ 1 ; 1925, ch.
42, § 1 7 ; 1925. ch. 116, §8;*1929, ch. 95,
§ l ; f c E . S. 1933 k C. 1943, 7-2-1.
Cross-Beference.
Change of name of state banking department and bank commissioner to department of financial institutions and commissioner of financial institutions, 7-1-1.1,
7-1-1.2.
Construction and. application.
The failure t o ' p a y the "fees" imposed
by section 7-1-10 is not made a ground for
t;\k\tvg possession of t h t business and
propertv of anv institution. Commercial
Bank of Utah v. State, 121 XL 576, 244 P.
2d 3C4.
Manner of taking possession by commissioner.
The commissioner may take possession
nnder this section without aid of the court.
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 U. 2C5; 15 P. 2d 283.
Nature of liquidation proceeding.
A proceeding for the suspension or
liquidation of any of the institutions
placed under the supervision of the banking department is an adversary proceeding. Such a proceeding, however, should
not be confused with a proceeding to
dissolve the association or forfeit its
charter. The differences are manifest. The
tact that suspension and liquidation may
result in practical dissolution is of no
moment. Tripp v. Third Judicial District
Lourt, b£ I", b. 5G P. 2d 1355.
Preferential rights of state.
Wiiere assets? of insolvent state bank
with state funds on deposit had passed
into lianas of commissioner for purpose ot
winding up oank's affairs for beneht of its
creditors before state asserted its prefer-

Status and position of commissioner.
The commissioner, in taking possession
under the authority of this section, is a
public officer or agent of the state and
derives his powers wholly from the statute; he is not an officer of the court, for
he takes possession of the property of
the institution and holds it without the
aid of. and despite, judicial action; therefore his custody of the property is not, as
is the custody of a court receiver, the
custody of the court. In short, he is a
mere executive creature of the statute, not
of the court, and can exercise only such
powers as the statute has given him.
Riches v. Hadlock, 80 V. 265, 15 P. 2d
283.
The commissioner is \ery different from
a chancery receiver. Nor is he a statutory
receiver with all of the powers of a chancery receiver. The marked dissimilarity
between the two is forcibly pointed out
at 80 U. 278 bv Mr. Justice Straup.
Riches v. Hadlock,' SO U. 205, 15 P. 2d 2S3.
When an action in suspension or liquidation is instituted by commissioner, in many
ways he occupies, as to the corporation,
the* position of plaintiff, representing creditors, stockholders, members, or otnerh having interests in the institution, while the
corporation occupies tiie position of defendant. Trix>p v. Third Juoicial District
Lour:. SP V.
2d
Collateral Eeferences.
BanKs and BankingC=>G33-l>.
I CJLS. Banks and Banking §422,
insolvency generally, 10 Am. J u r . 2d
710 et seq.. Banks § 754 et seq.

7-2-2. Jurisdiction of district court.—The district court in and for the
county in which such institution or the principal office thereof is situated
shall have jurisdiction in the liquidation of the afifairs of such institution
under the provisions of this chapter.
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7-3-4

A's of tlie United States, and to all corporations transacting a banking
siness in Ibis state, unless tbc context otherwise requires.
History: L. 1911, ch. 25, § 42; C. L. 1017,
015; R. S. 1033 * C. 19431 7-3.1.
_ ,
oss-Refercnce.
Change of name of Btate l i n k i n g dortiwiit and hank commissioner to dertint-iit of financial institution* and m m ssiniKT of financial instil utitmh, 7-1-1.1,
•1.2.

Collateral References.
1; . lllkj . Slllil }i a iikino<^=>4.
<• ('..I.S. Banks and Banking S C.
* *
Statute regulating hanks and trust coinpanics as special or class K-gislation, ur as
,l ( .,,ving the- equal protection of the law*,
111 A 1 11 140

7-3-2. Chapter applies to both savings and commercial banks.—All the
neral powers and privileges, as well as the general restrictions and
illations, provided for in this chapter and applying to the corporations
rranized and regulated hereunder under the general designation "banks"
nil be understood and construed to apply to and govern commercial
nks and savings banks, and those combining both of such branches of
e banking business.
rlistory: L. 1011, ch. 25, §43; C. L.
17, § 1016; R. S. 1933 L C. 1943, 7-8-2.

7-3-3. "Banking business" defined.—Any corporation holding itself out
the public as receiving money on deposit, whether evidenced by eertiate, promissory note or otherwise, shall be considered as doing a banking
siness and shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter as to such
siness.
History: L. 1911, eh. 25, $ 3 9 ; C. L. 1917,
012; R. S. 1933 k C. 1912, 7-3-3.

l*rfiuiiinns*, In Am. .1 ur. !M S.'-iS. Banks
§§ ]-.'i.

Jss-Eeferences.
tanking department within department
business regulation, ]:;•]•]«.
\il»tu*tion ;i(|riici<'S. hanks :%ui\ trust
npnnicb exempt from art r«-l:;tiug to,
1-7.

Wh.-jt is a "l.ank" or " l i n k e r " within
tin- tYdri;il rcvnim- ncls, l.'ii« A. L. B.
107;";.

[lateral References.
tanks and B:nikingC=>2.
» C B S . Banks and Banking g 1.

L a w Reviews.
Banking under the A nti-Trust Laws,
Adulf A. lierU., Jr., 4i» Colum. L. Bev. 58i».
n a l ,i;ing Brartiro,
Ut„.A
Tlll.ory
ailJ
Wilbcrl Ward, ?.!' Virginia L. how T.'iu.

7-3-4. Foreign corporations to comply with local law.—No foreign eorralion shall transact a banking business in this state without first coniplyr with all the requirements of the laws of this state relating to banks
d to the conduct of the banking business as provided in this chapter, nor
thout having complied with the other laws of this state relating to foreign
rporations.
history: L. 1911, ch. 25, 5 1 8 ; C. L.
L7, § 9 9 5 ; E . S. 1933 & C. 1942, 7-3-4.

Limitations on foreign hanking corporalions, in Am. dur. 2d 34, Banks J £'.

Llateral References.
tanks an»l BankingC=>lS.
> (J..1.S. Banks and Banking § .17.

National bank acting as executor, ailmiiiistmtor, trustee, or guaniian ah subjn-t tu stall- law in aiBuinistrat ion of estate, S." A. L. B. St>4.
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